Learning to Identify Security-Related Issues Using Convolutional Neural
  Networks by Palacio, David N. et al.
Learning to Identify Security-Related
Issues Using Convolutional Neural Networks
David N. Palacio, Daniel McCrystal, Kevin Moran,
Carlos Bernal-Ca´rdenas, Denys Poshyvanyk
Department of Computer Science
College of William & Mary
Williamsburg, VA
Email: {danaderp, dmrccr, kpmoran, cebernal, denys}@cs.wm.edu
Chris Shenefiel
Principal Engineer
Advanced Security Research Group
Cisco Systems
Email: cshenefi@cisco.com
Abstract—Software security is becoming a high priority for
both large companies and start-ups alike due to the increasing
potential for harm that vulnerabilities and breaches carry with
them. However, attaining robust security assurance while deliv-
ering features requires a precarious balancing act in the context
of agile development practices. One path forward to help aid
development teams in securing their software products is through
the design and development of security-focused automation. Ergo,
we present a novel approach, called SecureReqNet, for auto-
matically identifying whether issues in software issue tracking
systems describe security-related content. Our approach consists
of a two-phase neural net architecture that operates purely on
the natural language descriptions of issues. The first phase of
our approach learns high dimensional word embeddings from
hundreds of thousands of vulnerability descriptions listed in the
CVE database and issue descriptions extracted from open source
projects. The second phase then utilizes the semantic ontology
represented by these embeddings to train a convolutional neural
network capable of predicting whether a given issue is security-
related. We evaluated SecureReqNet by applying it to identify
security-related issues from a dataset of thousands of issues
mined from popular projects on GitLab and GitHub. In ad-
dition, we also applied our approach to identify security-related
requirements from a commercial software project developed by a
major telecommunication company. Our preliminary results are
encouraging, with SecureReqNet achieving an accuracy of 96%
on open source issues and 71.6% on industrial requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software has pervaded nearly every facet of modern society.
From banking, to art, to entertainment, the benefits that the
general public has enjoyed from the automation and ease
of use afforded by software applications is unprecedented.
However, the pervasive nature of modern software systems is a
double-edged sword, as more security- and privacy- sensitive
data is being managed by software than ever before. Thus,
the potential negative impacts of software vulnerabilities or
breaches is higher than ever. This can be readily seen in
the fallout from high-profile data breaches of companies such
as Experian [2]. Furthermore, past studies related to security
requirements have observed that development teams often do
not focus on security early in the development process [18]
and reconciling the implementation of security patches and
fixes with general maintenance related to bugs is a challenging
task as software evolves [15]. As the implications of software
security and safety have grown, so has the need for practition-
ers to take proactive measures to ensure the integrity of their
software systems during the development process.
Security procedures have become deeply integrated into
agile software development practices principles [3] due to
the constraints these practices impose [23]. For instance,
companies like Cisco Systems, Inc. and Microsoft Corp. have
been generating and adopting standards such as the Secure
Development Lifecycle (SDL) [1], [4] to effectively integrate
security practices into the Agile development process. How-
ever, in order to enable these development teams to implement
proactive software security practices, new tools are required
that automate repetitive or intellectually-intensive tasks that
would otherwise be delayed or abandoned during typical
software development and maintenance cycles. In this paper,
we aim to enable such automation by designing and evaluating
an approach that is capable of automatically differentiating
between security-related (SR) and non-security related (non-
SR) issues. This binary classification is performed in issue
tracking systems using as input only the Natural Language
(NL) contents of issue descriptions.
Software teams often use issue tracking systems to record
requirements, organize their work, and manage bug reporting.
As such, issues often contain information related to the secu-
rity requirements of an associated software project. We posit
that an effective technique for automating the identification
of issues that contain SR information can aid developers in
at least the following four ways: (i) when issues are used
to specify NL software requirements, automated identification
of SR issues could help developers more easily identify and
prioritize overlooked security-critical requirements; (ii) issues
that contain incoming security-sensitive bug reports can be
readily identified and more effectively prioritized and resolved;
(iii) the contents of automatically identified security issues
could be used to refine and focus future automated techniques
for traceability or feature location towards higher effectiveness
on security-critical software artifacts; (iv) identified SR issues
could be more effectively assigned to engineers with skills and
experience in security-critical software development.
Given the potentially positive impact that an effective au-
tomated security issue identification approach might have on
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developers, in this paper we design and implement a novel
technique for this problem based upon Natural Language pro-
cessing (NLP) techniques and Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs). Our key insight is that existing large corpora of open
source issues and security vulnerabilities can be mined and
used to learn rich semantic word embeddings. These embed-
dings can then be used as a feature representation to train a
shallow/deep neural network to distinguish between SR and
non-SR related issues. We implemented this approach, which
we call SecureReqNet, using several variations of CNN archi-
tectures specialized for NLP tasks. We applied our approach
to learn embeddings from a dataset combining text extracted
from (i) 52,908 CVE entries, (ii) 53,214 issues extracted from
the GitLab CE issue tracker and a set of prominent and diverse
projects mined from GitHub, and (iii) 10,000 general articles
mined from Wikipedia. We then trained the different variations
of CNN architectures on a subset of these CVEs, and both
security and non-security critical software issues. Finally, we
evaluate the end-to-end performance of our different variations
of SecureReqNet on a set of 1,032 unseen issues. Additionally,
we worked with Cisco Systems, Inc. to evaluate SecureReqNet
on a set of 69 requirements from a closed-source commercial
software project. The results of our evaluation are promising,
with the most effective variation of SecureReqNet achieving
an accuracy of 96% on the set of open source issues and 71.6%
on the set of industrial requirements.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• The design and implementation of a new technique, called
SecureReqNet for automatically identifying SR issues in
issue trackers using a combination of unsupervised and
supervised deep learning techniques.
• A comprehensive evaluation of our approach on both
open source issues and closed source requirements ex-
tracted from a commercial project developed by a major
telecommunications company.
• An online appendix [5] which includes a freely available,
open source implementation of our approach, pre-trained
models and weights to facilitate reproducibility, and all
the data1 used to train and evaluate our approach.
II. AUTOMATICALLY IDENTIFYING SECURITY RELATED
ISSUES
We propose SecureReqNet, a binary classifier (SR from
non-SR issues) that combines neural word embeddings with
adapted CNN architectures. We implemented four architecture
variations of SecureReqNet via adaptions to the shape of the
tensors, the size of the kernels in the convolutional layers, and
the number of neurons in the fully connected layers.
A. Learning Semantic Word Embeddings
In order to obtain a rich semantic feature space to support
training our CNN supervised models, our approach learns neu-
ral word embeddings using Word2Vec [20]. Recent work [12],
1We are not able to release the commercial dataset from our industrial
partner due to NDA restrictions.
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Fig. 1. The unsupervised Word2Vec network receives a word and its context
(skip-gram), each of which are mapped to a high dimensional vector. The
output layer is a softmax function that predicts the probability of the context
of the word. The network is trained using the mean squared error. Then, the
word vectors are extracted from the embedding layer (green box).
[7], [24] has illustrated the effectiveness of neural language
models learned using the Word2Vec family of models [20].
The Word2Vec group of models uses a shallow neural
network trained to predict the current word given surrounding
context (i.e., the continuous bag-of-words CBOW model) or
the surrounding context given the current word (i.e., the
skip-gram model). Fig. 1 depicts the unsupervised network
employed to vectorize the input samples (i.e., preprocessed
issues) in SecureReqNet. The result is a rich, high dimensional
vector space wherein each unique word in a training corpus
is assigned a vector. These word vectors are concatenated
to assemble a matrix. The rows indicate words in an issue
description and the columns the embedding dimension. There-
fore, each issue has an appropriate matrix that we use as an
input sample to SecureReqNet.
B. Adapting CNNs for NLP to Predict Security-related Issues
In this subsection we describe the four variations of
SecureReqNet’s CNN architecture. We provide complete im-
plementations of these architectures in our online appendix [5].
SecureReqNet (shallow) is based on the best architecture
achieved by Han et al. [12]. This architecture establishes one
convolution layer with three kernels of different shapes. Each
kernel corresponds to either a 1-gram, 3-gram, or 5-gram. The
kernel reduces the input matrix into a feature map. Then the
feature map is reduced into one cell through max pooling. The
generated cells are then flattened and converted into a vector.
Each kernel generates one vector. The final tensor is a merged
vector from the three vectors produced by the initial kernels.
Unlike Han et al.’s SVM multi-class output layer [12], we
instead utilize a binary classifier through a softmax layer.
SecureReqNet (deep) is an extension of SecureReqNet
(shallow) that includes an extra convolutional layer with an
extra max pooling and flattening function.
Alex-SecureReqNet (deep) is based on the proposed archi-
tecture by Krizhevsky et al. (AlexNet) [14], where 5 convo-
lutional layers extract features and 3 fully connected layers
reduce the dimensionality. We employ the standard AlexNet
but adapt the final softmax layer for our binary classification.
α-SecureReqNet (deep) modifies Alex-SecureReqNet at the
convolutional layers. The modification consists of adopting the
n-gram kernel strategy from Han et al. [12] which should com-
bine the learning capacity of AlexNet with the textual context
awareness provided by Han et al.’s approach. Fig. 2 provides
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Fig. 2. α-SecureReqNet CNN Architecture.
an illustration of this architecture. The first convolutional layer
has a kernel of 7-gram to reduce the input embedding matrix
into 32 vector feature maps. Then, it applies a max pooling
and a flattening function to derive a one column matrix. The
second convolutional layer has a kernel of 5-gram followed by
a max pooling and flattening function, which merges other 64
features into another column matrix. The third, fourth, and fifth
convolutional layers are very similar to the original layers in
AlexNet; however, these layers model kernels of 3-gram and
produce 128 and 64 features for the third and fourth layers
respectively. Three fully connected layers go after the last
convolutional layer to reduce the dimensionality and control
overfitting by means of three dropout units.
III. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
To evaluate SecureReqNet, we perform an empirical evalua-
tion with two major goals: (i) determine which CNN architec-
ture performs the best in terms of identifying SR issues, and
(ii) evaluate the effectiveness of our best performing model
on datasets from different domains. The quality focus of our
study is our approach’s effectiveness in terms of its ability to
accurately distinguish between SR and non-SR issues. To help
guide our evaluation, we formulate the following two research
questions (RQs):
• RQ1: Which SecureReqNet CNN architecture performs
best in terms of accurately identifying SR issues?
• RQ2: How well does our best CNN model perform
when identifying SR issues from both open source and
industrial issue trackers?
A. Study Context
The context of our empirical study includes the four datasets
(Embedding, Training, Validation, & Test) illustrated in Ta-
ble I. These datasets are comprised of textual documents from
six different sources:
CVE Database: Our CVE Dataset was derived by crawling
the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and extracting the
vulnerability description for each CVE entry. In total, we
extracted over 100,000 CVE descriptions, however, in order
to construct a dataset balanced equally between SR and non-
SR text, we randomly sampled 52,908 CVE descriptions.
GitLab Issues: To obtain a large set of diverse issues extracted
from the issue trackers of a high-quality open source project
we crawled the issue tracker of the GitLab Community Edition
(CE) project2. This project contains open source components
of the GitLab suite of developer tools (used by millions)
2https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues
TABLE I
DATASETS UTILIZED IN THE EMPIRICAL EVALUATION.
SECURITY-RELATED REQUIREMENTS (SR) AND NON SECURITY-RELATED
REQUIREMENTS (NON-SR).
Embedding
Dataset
Training
Dataset
Validation
Dataset
Testing
DatasetDataset Source Number of Documents
CVE Database 52,908 37,036 10,582 -
GitLab (SR) 578 405 116 58
GitLab (Non-SR) 578 405 116 58
GitHub (SR) 4,575 3,203 915 458
GitHub (Non-SR) 47,483 33,238 9,497 458
Wikipedia 10,000 - - -
Industry (SR) - - - 24
Industry (Non-SR) - - - 45
with an issue tracker that includes a sophisticated labeling
system. To extract SR issues, we crawled this issue tracker
and extracted issue descriptions containing “security” label.
To extract non-SR issues we extracted entries without the
“security” label and manually verified the non-SR nature of
the descriptions by randomly sampling of 10% of the issues.
GitHub Issues: Given the limited number of SR GitLab issues
that we were able to extract, we also crawled the issue trackers
of the most popular projects on GitHub (according to number
of stars) and extracted issues with the “security” tag in order to
derive a larger and more diverse dataset. Again, we randomly
crawled non-SR issues and performed a random sampling to
ensure the validity of the non-SR issues. We provide the full
list of GitHub projects in our online appendix [5].
Wikipedia Articles: If we trained our neural embeddings on
only highly specialized software text extracted from issues, we
risk our model not learning more generalized word contexts
that could help differentiate between SR and non-SR issues.
Thus, we randomly crawled and extracted the text from 10,000
Wikipedia articles in order to bolster the generalizablility of
our learned neural word embeddings.
Industrial Dataset: As part of our empirical evaluation we aim
to determine whether our approach can effectively identify SRs
in a set of commercial requirements extracted from a software
project developed by a large telecommunications company.
This dataset (labeled as “Industry” in Table I) consists of a set
of users stories, 24 of which are security- or privacy- sensitive,
extracted from a project under active development at Cisco
Systems, Inc.. Given the more informal language utilized in
these requirements, we view this dataset as a more challenging
domain for our approach to generalize to, and a preliminary
evaluation of its potential for commercial applicability.
The Embedding Dataset was used during the unsupervised
training of the Word2Vec skip-gram model in order to derive
rich embeddings for both SR and non-SR requirements. To
construct the Training, Validation, and Test datasets, we split
the Embedding Dataset according to a 70%/20%/10% (train-
ing/validation/test) split. Note that the training set utilizes CVE
descriptions as a proxy for SR issues, as these descriptions are
inherently SR and thus should provide sufficient discrimina-
tory context for our CNN model to learn. The data split we
utilized was performed with careful consideration for the type
of data our approach operates upon and thus adheres to two
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Fig. 3. SecureReqNet (Shallow) Trained to Optimal Capacity. The binary
cross-entropy loss is computed at each epoch. The accuracy is defined by
Acc = (TP +TN)/(TP +TN+FP +FN), where TP = True Positives,
TN = True Negatives, FP = False Positives, and FN = False Negatives.
important properties. First, we include only issues extracted
from open source issue trackers (and industrial user stories) in
our test set. We did not include CVE as examples of SR issues.
This is because CVEs tend to have more security-specific
language than SR issues, and we aim to determine if our
approach trained on CVEs can generalize to the more general
(or colloquial) language typically used in software issues.
Second, the software issues used in our training and testing
sets are temporal in nature. Thus, in a typical use case of
training our model, it would not be possible to train on issues
from the future to identify SR issues from the past. In fact this
could provide the model with “clairvoyant” knowledge which
could unfairly inflate our model’s performance. Therefore,
we ensure that the issues included in the testing set are
both unseen by the model, and originally created temporally
after all issues in the training and validation sets to ensure a
realistic experimental environment. All text was preprocessed
by converting all text to lower-case, removing stop words
numbers and punctuation, and performing snowball stemming.
B. Evaluation Methodology
For our empirical evaluation, we trained the four archi-
tectures described in Sec. II-B with the Training Dataset
described previously. Each input document was vectorized into
a 100 dimensional embedding using the neural embedding
approach described in Sec. II-A. The networks were trained
using a dropout rate of 0.2. The networks were also subject to
an early stopping mechanism, which monitored the validation
loss for 2,000 epochs with a patience of 100 epochs. During
training, we saved the optimal model weights according to
the early-stopping mechanism in addition to the final weights.
We tested the optimally trained configuration of each of the
four architectures on the Test Dataset described earlier. Given
that we aim to differentiate the open source project issues
from our set of industrial requirements, we report results for
these two sources of information separately. To measure the
effectiveness of our four architectures we report the accuracy
(given our binary classification task), test set loss, and Area
Under the Curve (AUC) computed via an ROC analysis.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. RQ1 Results: Comparing CNN Architectures
We present the results for all of our evaluation metrics in
Table II. This table provides the architecture configuration,
as well as pertinent hyper-parameters including the number
of kernels used in the convolutional layers, the total number
of model parameters (illustrating capacity), and the number of
epochs required to reach optimal network capacity and optimal
performance. When comparing our measured performance
metrics across models, we observe that SecureReqNet (shal-
low) and α-SecureReqNet tend to perform best overall, with
α-SecureReqNet achieving the best accuracy and AUC on the
industrial user stories, and SecureReqNet (shallow) achieving
the best loss and accuracy on the dataset of open source
issues. We also observe that Alex-SecureReqNet performs quite
poorly, which we attribute to its lack of n-gram context. One
interesting note when comparing the results between models
is that SecureReqNet (deep) achieved the lowest loss on the
Industry test dataset, without a large divergence from the
best accuracy reported by SecureReqNet (shallow) (0.7015
vs. 0.7164). This indicates that while SecureReqNet (shallow)
achieved the best performance on our particular set of commer-
cial user stories, we might expect SecureReqNet (deep) to ex-
hibit more stable performance on other similar datasets. Fig. 3
illustrates training and validation loss and accuracy during the
SecureReqNet (shallow) training process. We observed a test
validation loss of 0.1313 and accuracy of 0.9736 compared to
0.0272 and 0.9936 for the α-SecureReqNet respectively. Thus,
we found that the shallow architecture had a better training
performance through its minimization of generalization error.
B. RQ2 Results: Overall Performance
When examining the overall performance of our best per-
forming architecture configurations, we find the results to be
extremely promising. On our industrial set of user stories, α-
SecureReqNet achieved an accuracy of 0.7164. On our set of
open source issues, SecureReqNet (shallow) achieves an im-
pressive accuracy of 0.96. The performance of SecureReqNet
(shallow) on the set of open source issues is extremely
promising, as this dataset is quite diverse, and it illustrates the
ability of our approach to be trained and effectively applied
to unseen issues in a realistic setting.
V. RELATED WORK
A. Automated Identification of Security Requirements
The most closely related work to the approach that we
propose was conducted by Riaz et al. [22]. This approach
aims to automatically identify and classify security relevant
sentences in natural language requirements into one of ten
objective groups for a specified domain using a k-NN classifier
and a textual distance function. In contrast to this work, our
approach aims to perform a binary classification on a much
larger and more diverse dataset of issues in bug tracking
systems into SR or non-SR categories. To effectively classify
documents in such a diverse NL corpora our approach utilizes
a two-phase DL technique that learns unsupervised word
embeddings to train a CNN to classify issues. Additional
related research has been conducted to identify security re-
quirements from formal regulatory documents [6], [16], [21],
predict severity levels with rule learning by mining defect
TABLE II
NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURES RESULTS - BOLD NUMBERS REPRESENT BEST RESULTS
Neural Network
Architecture
Kernels
(n-gram) #Params
Opt. Capacity
(epochs)
Best Model
(epochs)
Industry Test Dataset Issues Test Dataset
Loss Acc. AUC Loss Acc. AUC
SecureReqNet (shallow) [1/3/5] 116,354 101 25 1.4325 0.7164 0.7 0.231 0.96 0.984
SecureReqNet (deep) [1/3/5] 662,018 104 4 0.859 0.7015 0.668 0.4044 0.8358 0.928
Alex-SecureReqNet (deep) [7→3] 6,052,866 112 72 5.2794 0.6567 0.5 7.6972 0.498 0.5
α-SecureReqNet (deep) [7→3] 100,946 104 40 2.3793 0.7164 0.747 0.2615 0.958 0.986
reports [19], and identify useful information from software
security documents [10]. Several studies and surveys have
been conducted that examine techniques and methodologies
for security requirements engineering [18], [8], [13], [17].
B. Applications of DL to Software Engineering Tasks
Using DL to help improve automate SE tasks is becoming
increasingly popular in the SE research community due to
its ability to automatically identify complex features in large
datasets and use these features to train effective prediction
models. While a full survey of the use of DL in software
engineering research is outside the scope of this paper, we
review the most closely related work to our own. We adapt
and build upon the work of Han et al. [12] who utilize a
CNN to predict the severity of software vulnerabilities listed
in the CVE database. More specifically, we adapt their CNN
architecture to contain more layers, granting our network the
necessary capacity to learn features from our highly diverse
dataset. Chen et al. [7] utilize neural word embeddings and
a CNN to help improve the proficiency of retrieving relevant
results on Stack Overflow when the queries are posed in a
language other than English. Xu et al. [24] utilize a similar
neural language model and CNN to link similar pieces of
information in Stack Overflow posts. Gu et al. [9] use an
RNN encoder-decoder model to help improve the effectiveness
of searching for API call sequences using natural language
queries. Guo et al. [11] utilize neural word embeddings and an
RNN to learn the semantics of existing trace links in a software
project in order to make effective predictions for additional
trace links. The advancements brought by these papers show
the promise of DL in helping to classify and retrieve software
artifacts, and motivate our approach.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed a two-stage CNN approach
for learning to automatically identify security-related issues in
issue tracking systems. We evaluated our approach on both
a large dataset of open source issues, and a smaller dataset
of industrial user stories. Our approach shows promising
performance, achieving high accuracy on both datasets. In the
future, we aim to perform a more in-depth empirical evaluation
comparing SecureReqNet to different baselines and apply our
approach to help contextualize other software engineering
tasks to security contexts.
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